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THE ELDERLY, THEIR HOMES  
AND THE UNCONSCIONABLE BARGAIN 
DOCTRINE 
 
 
By Dr Lorna Fox O’Mahony & Dr James Devenney* 
 
(1) INTRODUCTION 
 
Britain has an aging population: although overall population growth in the last 35 
years was just eight per cent, the elderly population (persons aged over 65) grew by 
31 per cent,
1
 and with birth rates falling and increasing numbers of people living into 
very old age, recent statistics have shown that the proportion of the population of 
England who are aged over 65 years of age is likely to grow from 15.6% in 2000 to 
19.2% by 2021.
2
  As the ‗baby-boomer generation‘3 reach retirement age, policy 
analysts are increasingly concerned with the implications for economic and social 
policies:
4
 ―[t]he economic and social wellbeing of the growing elderly population is, 
therefore, an important issue for society in general and for policy-makers in 
particular.‖5 
 
Policy questions relating to the elder population are recognised in a range of legal 
contexts – from medical law to estate planning, housing and social welfare to 
guardianship and disability rights
6
 - where it is recognised that the elderly may be 
                                                 
*
  Department of Law, University of Durham. 
1
 Social Trends 37, (available online at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?ID=949  ). 
2
 Statistics available online at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=949  
3
 ‗Baby boomers‘ is the term used to describe those people born between 1946 and 1964, when post-
World War II optimism led to a surge in population; see for example, J Harkin & J 
Huber, Eternal Youths: How the Baby boomers are having their time again (2004, Demos). 
4
 See for example, SA Nyce & SJ Schieber, The Economic Implications of Aging Societies: The Costs 
of Living Happily Ever After (2005, CUP); A Tinker, ‗The Social Implications of an Aging Population‘ 
(2002) 123 Mechanisms of Aging and Development 729; P Wallace, Agequake: Riding the 
Demographic Rollercoaster Shaking Business, Finance and Our World (1999, N Brearley Publishing); 
J Tavares Alvarez, Reflections on an Agequake (1999, UN-NGO Committee on Aging). 
5
 NK Kutty, ‗The Scope for Poverty Alleviation among Elderly Home-owners in the United States 
through Reverse Mortgages‘ (1998) 35 Urban Studies 113. 
6
 For example, in the UK, Solicitors for the Elderly is a national organisation of lawyers who specialise 
in elder law, and who describe their key objectives as: ―to develop expertise in areas of public and 
private law relevant to our clients‘ needs and where there is at present a skills shortage.  These include: 
Consent, capacity and substituted decision-making; Financial planning, including retirement and long-
  
2 
vulnerable to discrimination, disadvantage, neglect or abuse.  Yet, in addition to the 
vulnerability associated with aging per se, a range of social, economic, and political 
trends in recent decades have also ensured that this elderly population may face a 
specific set of risks in relation to financial transactions affecting their homes.  This 
paper considers elderly homeowners as a potentially ‗vulnerable population‘ in 
relation to financial transactions.  While recent research has challenged the suggestion 
that economic decision making is impaired by age,
7
 this paper argues that, distinct 
from the question of capacity for decision making, a series of contextual factors have 
exposed elderly homeowners to a new type of systemic vulnerability around financial 
transactions. 
 
(2) ELDER VULNERABILITY IN FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
 
It is, of course, not only elders who face risk in respect of homeownership, even 
before the credit crunch and mortgage meltdown that has followed the sub-prime 
lending crisis since 2006.  Following the boom and slumps in the UK housing market 
from the 1980s to the mid 1990s, Ford et al argued that a series of circumstances 
including economic recession, but also relating to changes to social, economic and 
political structures, had rendered home-ownership a much riskier undertaking that it 
hitherto had been.
8
  Even in a benign economic climate, with historically low interest 
rates, there was evidence of: ―…a set of more enduring socio-economic 
transformations which have raised the ‗normal‘ level of risk associated with home-
ownership compared to that which pertained in earlier periods.‖9  Adding to this the 
impact of the ‗credit crunch‘ and the threat of global recession, the ‗riskiness‘ of 
entering financial transactions affecting the home has been brought into particularly 
sharp relief.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
term care; Housing and social and health care issues; Dealing with abuse.‖; see 
http://www.solicitorsfortheelderly.com/public/index.php  
7
 S Kovalchik, CF Camerer, DM Grether, CR Plott & JM Allman, ‗Aging and Decision Making: A 
Comparison between neurologically healthy elderly and young individuals‘ (2005) 58 Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organisation 79; cf  E Peters, ML Finucane, D G McGregor & P Slovic in 
PC Stern & LL Carstensen (eds), The Aging Mind: Opportunities in Cognitive Research (2000, 
National Academy Press). 
8
 J Ford, R Burrows & S Nettleton, Home Ownership in a Risk Society: A social analysis of mortgage 
arrears and possessions (Bristol, Policy Press, 2001), Preface, vi.   
9
 Ibid, p44. 
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This paper suggests that, alongside these ‗typical‘ risks, the elderly can be viewed as a 
particularly vulnerable population in relation to financial transactions.  The business 
of financial services for elderly consumers is booming in Britain.  Old age can be a 
time of low income, as life events including retirement or the death of a spouse can 
considerably reduce the income of these elders, giving rise to a ‗pension gap‘ between 
pensioners‘ incomes and their cost of living.10  Furthermore, increasing longevity has 
created a large population of fixed income citizens of moderate means, with fewer 
wage earners, and more likely to be reliant on public or private pensions, private 
investments or savings.  This period of life may also coincide with increasing costs, 
which UK elders are increasingly expected to fund through private means rather than 
relying on social welfare.
11
   
 
Another important characteristic of the aging baby-boomers is that, while for much of 
the twentieth century the elderly were less likely to own their own homes than other 
demographic groups this figure has been increasing steadily with many elder 
households now owning their homes mortgage free: 56% of those aged over 75 are 
outright owners, with a further 3% owning subject to a mortgage; while 64% of the 
65-74 cohort are outright owners, with a further 9% owning subject to a mortgage.
12
  
Overall, 75% of retired persons are owner-occupiers (against 70% in the general 
population).
13
  Yet, alongside significant asset holding, elderly homeowners may find 
themselves ‗house-rich but income-poor‘.14  This creates a substantial population for 
whom release of equity from their homes will be a potentially attractive (or useful or 
necessary) strategy to generate income in their elder years.
15
  Wealth tied up in the 
                                                 
10
 For studies analysing the economic needs of elders, see S Middleton, R Hancock, K Kellard, J 
Beckhelling, V Phung and K Perren, Measuring Resources in Later Life: a review of the data (Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, 2007); and K Hill, K Kellard, S Middleton, L Cox and E Pound, Understanding 
Resources in Later Life: views and experiences of older people (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2007).  
11
 Thus, in relation to nursing care, for example, in many cases, private means must be exhausted 
before public funds become available; see generally, SJ Smith, Banking on Housing: Speculating on 
the role and relevance of housing wealth in Britain (Paper prepared for the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation Inquiry into Home Ownership 2010 and Beyond, 2005). 
12
 Social Trends 31 (2001),Table 10.7; see also R Forrest, P Leather & C Pantazis, Home Ownership in 
Old Age: The Future of Owner-Occupation in an Ageing Society (1997, Oxford, Anchor Trust). 
13
 Social Trends 34 (2004), Table 10.9. 
14
 K Rowlingson, ‗―Living Poor to Die Rich‖?  Or ―Spending the Kids‘ Inheritance‖?  Attitudes to 
Assets and Inheritance in Later Life‘ (2006) 35 Journal of Social Policy 175; J Bull & J Poole, Not 
Rich, Not Poor: A Study of Housing Options for Elderly People on Middle Incomes (1989, Oxford: 
SHAC/Anchor Housing Trust). 
15
 See generally, R Hancock, ‗Can Housing Wealth Alleviate Poverty among Britain‘s Older 
Population?‘ (1998) 19 Fiscal Studies 249. 
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home is currently regarded as: ―…more ‗spendable‘ now than it will be ever again.‖16  
Owned homes are increasingly regarded as a repository of financial value, with the 
expectation that: ―…the asset value of housing…accumulates over the life course, 
provides a cushion (in the form of low housing costs) for old age, and flows on to the 
next generation through inheritance.‖;17 or, if the next generation cannot wait for 
inheritance, by releasing equity and gifting capital, or by acting as surety for the debts 
of their adult children.
18
   
 
While there are many reasons – financial, political and personal – why elders may 
wish to release capital or income from their homes to fund expenses in later life, the 
use of an owned home in this way also raises interesting issues about the tensions 
between the preservation of the home as a dwelling place for old age – extensively 
analysed in the ‗aging in place‘ literature19 - and the use of the home as a financial 
asset, for the elder or for inheritance.  Notwithstanding the importance of retaining 
their ‗place‘ for elders‘ autonomy, independence, identity, and continuity in 
community,
20
 empirical research has recently highlighted the pragmatism with which 
elders typically approach issues relating to equity release and the need to use their 
homes as an asset, to release capital or income for expenses in their old age:
21
   
 
Previous research suggested that people wished to keep their housing assets intact during their 
later life, not so much in order to pass on these assets to the next generation but because they 
feel they have an ‗inalienable right‘ to their housing wealth.  People in this position might be 
                                                 
16
 Smith, supra n14, p2.   
17
 Ibid, p11. 
18
 This is described by Fiona Burns as ‗intergenerational debt‘; see for example, F Burns, ‗Protecting 
elders: Regulating intergenerationally transmitted debt in Australia‘, (2005) 28 International Journal of 
Law and Psychiatry 300.   
19
 For example, GD Rowles & H Chaudhury, Home and Identity in Late Life: International 
Perspectives (Springer, 2005); G Mowl, R Pain & C Talbot, ‗The ageing body and homespace‘ 
(2000)32 Area 189; PC Kontos, ‗Resisting Institutionalization: Constructing Old Age and Negotiating 
Home‘ (1998)12 Journal of Aging Studies 167.  Rowles and Chaudhury suggested, for example, that: 
―Especially with the loss of social roles, retirement, physical frailty, and environmental changes, for 
many older adults the past experience of home may hold different meanings.‖; p11.  For a discussion of 
the relationship between aging in place and housing law, see J Pynoos, C Nishita, C Cicero, and R 
Caraviello, ‗Aging in Place, Housing, and the Law‘ (2008) 16 Elder Law Journal (forthcoming). 
20
 See GD Rowles & H Chaudhury, ‗Home and Identity in Late Life: International Perspectives‘, in 
Rowles and Chaudhury, supra n19; Frank Oswald and Hans-Werner Wahl, ‗Dimensions of the 
Meaning of Home in Later Life‘, in Rowles and Chaudhury, supra n19; Robert L Rubinstein & Kate de 
Medeiros, ‗Home, Self, and Identity‘ in Rowles and Chaudhury, supra n19. 
21
 K Rowlingson & S McKay, Attitudes to inheritance: A Literature Review and Secondary Analysis of 
Data (2004, Joseph Rowntree Foundation); Rowlingson, supra n14; see also IF Megbolugbe, J Sa-
Aadu & JD Shilling, ‗Oh, Yes, the Elderly Will Reduce Housing Equity under the Right 
Circumstances‘ (1997) 8 Journal of Housing Research 53.    
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living a frugal lifestyle in order to preserve their housing assets.  They will be ‗living poor in 
order to die rich‘.22   
 
Rowlingson notes that: ―[t]he social policy concern here is that people might be 
impoverishing themselves and potentially damaging their health by not taking 
advantage of the assets they have.‖23  However, the elders interviewed in this 2004 
study typically took a balanced approach to the tensions between ‗home as asset‘ and 
‗home as inheritance‘, leading Rowlingson to conclude that:  
 
…people are more pragmatic about their property.  Ideally, they would like to be able to 
maintain their property intact – both for their own purposes and in order to bequeath – but 
they are aware that their income in later life is likely to be fairly low.  Rather than expecting 
the state to resolve this issue by substantially increasing pension incomes, people seem to 
expect that they themselves may have to access their housing equity at some point in the 
future to maintain a reasonable living standard.
24
  
 
This conclusion appeared to point to greater scope for the use of equity release 
products, if consumers were to become sufficiently confident in the products on offer: 
―[t]he options currently available to access equity are generally undesirable to many 
people at present, but they are not strictly averse to the principle of unlocking housing 
equity.‖25     
 
While lack of consumer confidence in the sector has long acted as a barrier to market 
growth in this area,
26
 recent changes in the regulatory framework relating to equity 
release products has meant that consumer confidence seems likely to rise.  This paper 
argues, however, that notwithstanding the increase in regulation, there are a number 
of important issues relating to legal responses, particularly in light of the particular 
and specific vulnerabilities that elderly homeowners experience in relation to financial 
transactions affecting their homes, which could be usefully considered.  Financial 
products such as equity release schemes are often explicitly targeted at elderly 
                                                 
22
 Rowlingson, supra n14, p176. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid, p187. 
25
 Ibid, 187-8. 
26
 See D Hirsch, Consultation Response to HM Treasury: ‗Regulating home reversion plans‘, (February 
2004); available online at www.jrf.org.uk/knowledge/responses/docs/homereversion.asp; see also R 
Terry and R Gibson, Overcoming obstacles to equity release (2006, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Ref 
1939).   
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consumers, and this also raises important questions about the ways in which any 
protection which might be available under the law is suitable to meet the needs of 
vulnerable elders.  While current legal approaches to vulnerable elders in the context 
of financial transactions are limited, we argue that there is considerable potential, 
within existing legal doctrine, to better map law‘s response onto the reality of the 
elder‘s contextual experience of using their homes to raise capital, to ensure adequate 
legal protection against unscrupulous or unconscionable transactions.  In section 3 we 
outline the regulatory context within which creditors are governed in England and 
Wales, and assess the extent to which recent developments in the jurisdiction of the 
Financial Services Authority will effectively address the vulnerability which has been 
acknowledged in this context.  Section 4 then proceeds to examine the role which the 
doctrine of undue influence and the unconscionable bargain doctrine might play in 
this context.  
 
(3) THE REGULATORY APPROACH 
 
In Parliamentary debates preceding the extension of the Financial Services 
Authority‘s regulatory ‗umbrella‘ to include equity release, a number of key headlines 
were emphasised, including that: ―We must bear it in mind that the purchase of a 
home is the biggest financial investment that any individual or family makes.  Given 
that the problem affects people who have already paid off a mortgage and are now in 
retirement, it compounds the vulnerability of the people taking out the schemes…‖27  
Yet with equity release per se increasingly recognised as an important mechanism for 
improving quality of life for elderly homeowners,
28
 much depends on the nature of the 
product, the context and terms of the transactions, and, the present authors would 
argue, on the ‗conscionability‘ of the bargain struck between the creditor and the 
elderly homeowner.  
 
Equity release schemes are generally marketed as products to enable elderly home 
owners to tap into the value of their homes – their ‗equity‘ – without having to sell up 
altogether and move out.  Although the terms of equity release products vary, the 
general idea is that the homeowner receives a payment of capital, the ‗loan‘, which is 
                                                 
27
 Ibid.  
28
 See discussion in section 2. 
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not scheduled for repayment by instalments, but which is secured against the equity 
which the borrower holds clear of any other secured debt in the owner-occupied 
home, and which accumulates until the property becomes ‗available‘, when the 
elderly homeowner dies or decides to sell, at which point the creditor is entitled to 
execute its claim against the capital.  There are as many equity release products on the 
market as the imaginations of credit suppliers can create, but two principal types of 
scheme have tended to dominate the UK market in recent years: (1) home reversion 
plans and (2) lifetime mortgages.   
 
‗Home reversion plans‘ involve the sale of a portion of the total value of the property 
to the product provider in exchange for a lump sum payment, or an income for life, or, 
in some cases, a combination of lump sum and income.  This type of scheme utilises a 
form of co-ownership, since the ‗vendor‘ continues to own a portion of the property 
as tenant in common with the ‗purchaser‘ company.  Both co-owners will benefit 
from any increase in value, proportionate to their shares, and the elderly occupier‘s 
share continues to be an inheritable asset for the purposes of his or her estate.  These 
arrangements typically include an agreement as to occupation between the co-owners 
(the vendor-occupier and the purchaser-credit company) that allows the occupier to 
continue to live in the property, paying a peppercorn ‗occupation rent‘, until they die 
or until the house is sold.
29
  A ‗lifetime mortgage‘, in contrast, is more readily 
comparable to a standard interest-only mortgage against equity in the property, 
although the ‗borrower‘ does not make any repayments of interest during their 
lifetime; rather, the ‗repayments‘ due are ‗rolled up‘ – or added to the mortgage 
capital, with the whole debt to be paid off when the borrower dies or when the 
property is sold. 
 
Until relatively recently, British consumers approached the prospect of equity release 
with some trepidation.  It is likely that this lack of consumer confidence was 
significantly influenced by the negative publicity that followed the upsurge in reverse 
mortgages during a period of ‗boom and bust‘ in the British housing market in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, when many households lost their homes through 
                                                 
29
 In some cases the property may be sold in order to release the remaining equity to fund further 
expenses, for example the costs of nursing care.   
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repossession.
30
  However, in recent years there has been a major growth in the equity 
release market in Britain, which is attributable to several factors.  The first is the rise 
in self-regulation amongst equity release providers in Britain, the majority of whom 
(approximately 90%) are members of Safe Home Income Plans (SHIP).  SHIP, which 
was launched in 1991, describes itself as ‗dedicated entirely to the protection of 
planholders and promotion of safe home income and equity release plans.‘31  All 
participating companies pledge to observe the SHIP Code of Practice, which binds the 
companies to provide a fair, easy-to-understand and full presentation of their plans, 
and these providers also give their customers a ‗no negative equity guarantee‘, which 
means that they are assured that they will never owe more than the value of their 
homes.
32
  Founded with four member companies, there are now 21 member 
companies, estimated to supply about 90% of equity release funds by volume in the 
UK.
33
  The equity release sector is now big business in Britain, with the market share 
of SHIP members to reach £1.279 billion in 2007, an 11% increase on full year 
figures for 2006.
34
  Indeed, a recent survey of SHIP members has predicted that their 
total market share for 2010 could reach £2.19 billion.
35
   
 
Alongside this self-regulation, considerable attention has recently been focused on 
government regulation of equity release.  The ‗lifetime mortgage‘ or ‗reverse 
mortgage‘ sector has been regulated by the Financial Services Authority (FSA)36 
since it took over responsibility for regulation of the mortgage industry in October 
2004,
37
 and in April 2007 the FSA umbrella extended to cover home reversion plans 
                                                 
30
 ‗During the 1980s [in the UK], equity release came under scrutiny and suffered a bad reputation due 
to poorly designed and marketed products that led to several court cases.‘; C Huan & J Mahoney, 
‗Equity Release Mortgages‘ (2002) 16 Housing Finance International 29 at 33.  This analysis uses the 
examples of home income plans and interest roll-up loans to identify weaknesses in equity release 
products in the UK, which led to escalating debt, left consumers vulnerable to rising interest rates and 
falling house prices, and led to forced sale of their homes.       
31
 See http://www.ship-ltd.org/about/index.shtml  
32
 A worst case scenario which would leave homeowners exposed to not only repossession but further 
personal actions to recover additional outstanding debt. 
33
 See http://www.ship-ltd.org/bm~doc/08-dec-2007a.pdf  
34
 See SHIP Press Release, 8 December 2007, available online at http://www.ship-ltd.org/bm~doc/08-
dec-2007a.pdf  
35
 ibid. 
36
 The FSA is an independent, non-government body, given statutory powers by the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000, to regulate the financial services industry in the UK and it has four objectives 
under the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000: maintaining market confidence; promoting 
public understanding of the financial system; securing the appropriate degree of protection for consumers; 
and fighting financial crime. 
37
 Brought under the FSMA 2000 by the Financial Services And Markets Act 2000 (Regulated 
Activities) Order 2001. 
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through the Regulation of Financial Services (Land Transactions) Act 2005,
38
 with a 
view to filling a gap that existed in the regulation of equity release products.  In 
considering this legislation, the government recognised that purchasing an equity 
release product is a major decision, with tax, inheritance and long-term financial 
planning implications,
39
 and also, crucially, that the function of regulation in this 
context is specifically targeted at providing information and advice.  On introducing 
the second reading of the Bill, Lord McKenzie stated that: 
 
Regulation is not designed to discourage people from purchasing these products, but to help 
them make informed choices, offer valuable consumer protection and ensure there is a level 
playing field in the equity release market, most of which already falls within the scope of the 
FSA mortgage regulation…these are not simple products to understand, hence the need to 
ensure that potential purchasers receive an appropriate level of advice.
40
  
 
The touchstone of the legislative policy of this Act was emphasised once again in 
Lord McKenzie‘s closing comments when he claimed that the Bill would: ―…open 
the door to important consumer protections to be extended to vulnerable and minority 
consumers, level the playing field in mortgage regulation, ensure that no artificial 
distortions go forward, bolster consumer confidence in those products and thus help to 
ensure that the markets continue to develop.‖41  
 
As Lord McKenzie acknowledged in his speech, equity release products are generally 
both complex and expensive, and the provision of clearer information and advice for 
consumers - especially elderly consumers - to ensure that they are able to make 
informed decisions, is undoubtedly welcome.  In addition, the requirements 
concerning the quality of information supplied by the equity release provider are 
copper-fastened by giving borrowers greater recourse to apply to the Financial 
Ombudsman Service to claim compensation if they believe they have been mis-sold a 
product.
42
   
                                                 
38
 Regulation of Financial Services (Land Transactions) Act 2005. 
39
 ―Buying a home reversion plan is a huge financial decision involving the most important and 
sometimes only significant asset of elderly people.  It can have significant implications for tax, 
benefits, inheritance and long-term financial planning, which need to be considered very carefully.‖ HL 
Deb 17 October 2005 c. 554 (Lord McKenzie). 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 HL Deb 17 October 2005 c. 558 (Lord McKenzie). 
42
 See Financial Services and Market Regulation Act 2000, Part XV. 
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Yet while this shift to a stronger regulatory framework for equity release products will 
go a long way to addressing many of the (sometimes catastrophic) difficulties 
encountered by British consumers who purchased these products in the 1980s and 
1990s, the regulatory framework has limited scope.  In particular, legal regulation 
through the FSA is directed primarily at disciplining the behaviour of the creditor.  
Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, creditors sign up to the FSA‘s 
scheme in order to become ‗authorised‘ – receiving the quality ‗kite-mark‘ to signify 
products which consumers can trust.  While the compensation scheme purports to 
provide a safety net for users of regulated services, there are three important points to 
note regarding the scope of the regulatory scheme: (1) the emphasis of the FSA 
scheme is on clear information and advice, to ensure an informed decision can be 
made; (2) the function of the regulatory protection offered by the FSA is largely to 
avoid claims by regularising the activities of the credit provider, although in cases 
where an authorised creditor breaches the rules of the scheme, for example rules 
requiring clear information, the remedy for the claimant is compensation only; and (3) 
that social and economic factors at work in this context, sometimes coupled with 
relational pressures, may still leave an informed elder in a vulnerable position.  In 
other words, there remain a separate set of issues, not adequately addressed through 
regulatory schemes (which focus on governing creditor activities and the content of 
products), which are rooted in the social, economic and cultural contexts in which the 
‗purchase‘ of equity release products by elderly homeowners has been mainstreamed 
in Britain.   
 
It is, therefore, pertinent to consider the wider protection – beyond regulation - 
afforded to the elderly in connection with equity release schemes.  Indeed, the 
suggestion that the FSA is enjoying some considerable success in improving 
consumer confidence
43
 makes this task particularly apposite.  In section 4 we explore 
the nature, and extent, of the protection given to the elderly by the doctrine of undue 
influence and the unconscionable bargain doctrine in equity release schemes.  In 
particular, we argue that the unconscionable bargain doctrine – a doctrine which is 
particularly sensitive to the terms of the transaction, the effectiveness of any 
                                                 
43
 ‗Equity release – time to grow?‘ Mortgage Finance Gazette (May 2007), available online at 
http://www.mfgonline.co.uk/ccstory/20235/130/Equity_release_%E2%80%93_time_t   
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independent advice, informational inequalities and the vulnerabilities of the parties – 
may provide an appropriate vehicle for the protection of the elderly in this context. 
 
(4) UNDUE INFLUENCE, THE UNCONSCIONABLE BARGAIN DOCTRINE 
AND THE PROTECTION OF ELDERS IN EQUITY RELEASE SCHEMES 
 
(a) Introduction 
 
The doctrine of undue influence may afford elders with a measure of protection in 
relation to financial transactions involving their home.
44
  Indeed, although the 
doctrine of undue influence is often closely associated with relationships of trust and 
confidence,
45
 it is clear that the operation of the doctrine is not confined to such 
relationships.
46
  Thus in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge
47
 Lord Nicholls, in the 
context of relational undue influence, noted that: 
 
…there is no single touchstone for determining whether the principle is applicable.  Several 
expressions have been used in an endeavour to encapsulate the essence: trust and confidence, 
reliance, dependence or vulnerability on the one hand and ascendency, domination or control 
on the other.  None of these descriptions is perfect.  None is all embracing.  Each has its 
proper place.
48
 
 
However, the precise nature, and extent, of the protection given to the elderly by the 
doctrine of undue influence in relation to financial transactions involving their home 
will, of course, depend on the jurisprudential basis, and hence the essence, of the 
doctrine of undue influence.  For example, if the doctrine of undue influence focuses 
                                                 
44
 It has been noted above that the motivations for equity release may vary, to encompass pressure as a 
result of both the needs of the elder themselves, and the needs of adult children who may wish that the 
elder use an owned home to release equity to enable the adult offspring to ‗cash in‘ their inheritance 
early, often to fund their own house purchase.  In this regard, it is interesting to note that where a 
transaction has been procured by undue influence, or unconscionability, on the part of the other party 
thereto, the party subject to the influence, or unconscionable conduct, will, subject to certain bars, be 
entitled to have the transaction set aside.  By contrast, where the transaction has been procured by the 
undue influence, or unconscionability, of a third party – perhaps the children of the elder - the position 
is more complex and may depend on the principles of notice as set out in Royal Bank of Scotland v 
Etridge [2001] UKHL 44.  For an analysis of those principles in the context of transactions with the 
elderly see FR Burns, ‗The elderly and undue influence inter vivos‘ [2003] 23 Legal Studies 251 and 
Portman Building Society v Dusangh [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 221.  
45
  cf. Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] A.C. 180. 
46
  See Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch. D 145 and Re Craig (decd) [1970] 2 All ER 390. 
47
  [2001] UKHL 44. 
48
  Ibid. at [11]. 
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solely on the capacity of the elderly person,
49
 the protection provided by the doctrine 
of undue influence in equity release schemes is likely to be peripheral.
50
 The 
vulnerability of elders in this context is more likely to stem from social and economic 
factors
51
 rather than from a lack of capacity;
52
 and an important question in this 
context is whether or not it is deemed appropriate for legal doctrine to respond to 
these social and economic contextual factors.   
 
Yet, despite the Brobdingnagian amount of academic literature on the subject,
53
 the 
jurisprudential basis of the doctrine of undue influence remains obscure.
54
  Indeed in 
Niersmans v Pesticcio
55
 Mummery LJ stated: 
 
The striking feature of this appeal is that fundamental misconceptions [about the doctrine of 
undue influence] persist, even though the doctrine is over 200 years old and its basis and 
scope were examined by the House of Lords in depth…less than 3 years ago in the well 
known case of Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No.2) [2002] 2 AC 773.  The continuing 
confusions matter.  Aspects of the instant case demonstrate the need for a wider 
understanding, both in and outside the legal profession, of the circumstances in which the 
                                                 
49
 cf. M Chen-Wishart, ‗Undue Influence: Beyond Impaired Consent and Wrongdoing towards a 
Relational Analysis‘, in A Burrows and A Rodger (eds.), Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory of Peter 
Birks (OUP, Oxford, 2006) at pp 207-211. 
50
  See FR Burns, supra n44, at 253-255. 
51
  See Section 2, above. 
52
  See the text to n7 above. 
53
 See, for example, P Birks and Y Chin, ‗On the Nature of Undue Influence‘, published in J Beatson & 
D Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law, (1995, Clarendon, Oxford); R Bigwood, 
‗Undue Influence: ‗Impaired Consent‘ or ‗Wicked Exploitation‘‘ (1996) 16 OJLS 503, J O‘Sullivan, 
‗Undue Influence and Misrepresentation after O‘Brien: Making Security Secure‘, in F Rose (ed), 
Restitution and Banking Law, (Mansfield Press, Oxford, 1998) pp42-69,  B Fehlberg, Sexually 
Transmitted Debt, (Clarendon, Oxford, 1997) pp24-25, S Smith, Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of 
Contract, 6
th
 edn, (Clarendon, Oxford, 2002) pp288-291, M Pawlowski & J Brown, Undue Influence 
and the Family Home, (Cavendish, London 2002) pp7-17, 27-30 and 205-212, M Oldham, ‗―Neither 
borrower nor lender be‖ – the life of O‘Brien‘ (1995) Child and Family Law Quarterly 104, at 108-
109,  M Chen-Wishart, ‗The O‘Brien Principle and Substantive Unfairness‘ [1997] CLJ 60, D Capper, 
‗Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation‘ (1998) 114 LQR 479, Price, ‗Undue 
Influence: finis litium‘ (1999) 115 LQR 8,  L McMurtry, ‗Unconscionability and Undue Influence: An 
Interaction?‘ [2000] 64 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 573, Chen-Wishart, supra n49, & J 
Devenney & A Chandler, ‗Unconscionability and the Taxonomy of Undue Influence‘ [2007] Journal 
of Business Law 541. 
54
 See, generally, J Elvin, ‗The Purpose of the Doctrine of Presumed Undue Influence‘, in Giliker (ed), 
Re-examining Contract and Unjust Enrichment: Anglo-Canadian Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden, 2007).  In Portman Building Society v Dusangh [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221 at 
233 Ward LJ stated: ―Professors Birks and Chin…see undue influence as being ‗plaintiff-sided‘ and 
concerned with the weakness of the plaintiff's consent owing to an excessive dependence upon the 
defendant, and unconscionability as being ‗defendant-sided‘ and concerned with the defendant‘s 
exploitation of the plaintiff‘s vulnerability.  I do not find it necessary to resolve this debate.‖  
55
 [2004] EWCA Civ 372. 
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court will intervene to protect the dependant and the vulnerable in dealings with their 
property.
56
 
 
In their seminal paper on the jurisprudential basis of the doctrine of undue influence, 
Professors Birks and Chin
57
 argued that ―the doctrine of undue influence is about 
impaired consent, not about wicked exploitation.‖58  In so doing, Birks and Chin 
identified two models by which undue influence might be classified.
59
  Under the first 
model – the so-called ‗claimant-sided‘ approach – the emphasis is on the vulnerability 
of the claimant.  In the context of equity release schemes, such an approach would 
focus on the potential vulnerability of the elder.  By contrast, the second model 
identified by Birks and Chin – the so-called ‗defendant-sided‘ analysis – is more 
concerned with the conduct of the other party to the transaction.  In the context of 
equity release schemes, such an approach would often
60
 focus on the conduct of the 
equity release provider.  Thus, while concerns with ‗wicked exploitation‘ resonate 
with a defendant-sided view of undue influence, the claimant sided approach would 
arguably be more responsive to the context in which the elder entered into the 
transaction, so that: ―[I]t is not necessary for the party claiming relief to point to fraud 
or unconscionable behaviour on the part of the other.‖61   
 
Birks and Chin‘s thesis in support of a claimant-sided approach to undue influence 
has gained some support in the case law.
62
 Yet their overall thesis is not 
unproblematic: for example, it arguably tends towards a pathological view of ‗trust‘,63 
and, within a claimant-sided framework, it may take an unduly restrictive, capacity 
driven, view of undue influence.
64
  It also contrasts uncomfortably with the language 
employed both by the House of Lords in its landmark decisions of National 
Westminster Bank plc v Morgan,
65
 Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien66 and Royal Bank of 
                                                 
56
 Ibid. at [2]. 
57
 Birks & Chin, supra n53.  
58
 Ibid, at p126.  
59
  It should, however, be noted that these models are contested: see, for example, Bigwood, supra n53. 
60
  Although not always: see n44 above. 
61
  Birks & Chin, supra n53 at p126. 
62
  See, for example, Hammond v Osborn [2004] EWCA Civ 885, Turkey v Awadh [2005] EWCA Civ 
382 and Jennings v Cairns [2003] EWCA 1935.  cf. Macklin v Dowsett [2004] EWCA Civ 904 and 
Dunbar Bank plc v Nadeem [1998] 3 All E.R. 876 (discussed in A Chandler, ‗Manifest Disadvantage: 
Limits of Application‘ (1999) 115 LQR 213).   
63
 See Chen-Wishart, supra n49 at p208. 
64
 Ibid. 
65
 [1985] A.C. 686. 
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Scotland v Etridge (No 2),
67
 and with more recent opinions of the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council
68
 which adopt an unconscionability-based approach to undue 
influence.
69
 
 
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of Birks and Chin‘s thesis is the linking of the 
concept of unconscionability to a notion of ‗wicked exploitation‘.  Unconscionability 
is a delicate concept and although few would argue that unconscionability requires 
malign intent, it is (perhaps) less obvious, given the connotations of conscience, that 
relief on the grounds of unconscionability can be claimant-sided relief and so focused 
on the potential vulnerability of, for example, an elder.
70
  Nevertheless, relief on the 
ground of unconscionability can be claimant-sided relief, and this, as we shall see, can 
be demonstrated by reference to the case law on the unconscionable bargain doctrine - 
a doctrine which has both contextual and historical links with the doctrine of undue 
influence
71
 - where many of the leading cases adopt a clear claimant-sided 
orientation.
72
 
 
Indeed one of the current authors has argued
73
 that the doctrine of undue influence is 
based on a notion of unconscionability which finds resonance in the unconscionable 
                                                                                                                                            
66
 [1994] A.C. 180. 
67
 [2001] UKHL 44.  In that case Lord Nicholls, at [6-7], stated: ―Undue influence is one of the grounds 
of relief developed by courts of equity as a court of conscience.  The objective is to ensure that the 
influence of one person over another is not abused.  In everyday life people constantly seek to 
influence the decisions of others.  They seek to persuade those with whom they are dealing to enter 
transactions, whether great or small.  The law has set limits to the means properly employable for this 
purpose… Equity extended the reach of the law to other unacceptable forms of persuasion.  The law 
will investigate the manner in which the intention to enter into the transaction was secured: ‗how the 
intention was produced‘, in the oft repeated words of Lord Eldon LC, from as long ago as 1807 
(Huguenin v Basely (1807) 14 Ves. Jun. 273 at 300, [1803-1813] All E.R. Rep. 1 at 13).  If the 
intention was produced by unacceptable means, the law will not permit the transaction to stand.  The 
means used is regarded as an exercise of improper or ‘undue’ influence, and hence unacceptable, 
whenever the consent thus procured ought not fairly to be treated as the expression of a person‘s free 
will.‖ (emphasis added).  Lord Hobhouse added, at [103], that undue influence ―is an equitable wrong 
committed by the dominant party against the other which makes it unconscionable for the dominant 
party to enforce his legal rights against the other.‖  Lord Bingham agreed with Lord Nicholls. 
68
  See R v Attorney-General for England and Wales [2003] UKPC 22 and National Commercial Bank 
(Jamaica) Ltd v. Hew’s Executors [2003] UKPC 51. The late Professor Birks acknowledged the 
difficulties that these decisions created for his thesis: see P Birks, ‗Undue Influence as Wrongful 
Exploitation‘ (2004) 120 LQR 34.  
69
 See further Devenney & Chandler, supra n53 at pp541-542. 
70
  Devenney & Chandler, supra n53.   
71
 See, for example, Evans v Llewellin (1787) 1 Cox CC 333. 
72
 See below, n124-135 and text thereto. 
73
 Devenney & Chandler, supra n53.   
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bargain doctrine in general, and specifically with cases such as Evans v Llewellin,
74
 
Baker v Monk,
75
 Fry v Lane,
76
  and Cresswell v Potter.
77
  In particular, although we 
would argue that there is an (often overlooked) overriding unconscionability 
requirement to the doctrine of undue influence,
78
 it can be argued that the existing 
elements of undue influence serve as a covert means of distinguishing between 
conscionable and unconscionable dealings.
79
  For example, as we have noted, a 
finding of trust and confidence, reliance, dependency or vulnerability may be central 
to a finding of undue influence; but how much trust and confidence, reliance, 
dependency or vulnerability is required?  Professors Birks and Chin were of the 
opinion that the influence needed to be ―excessive‖80 and they were apparently 
adopting a high threshold.
81
  Yet it is not at all clear that the relevant case law 
supports such an approach.
82
  Indeed the relevant case law appears to take a more 
fluid approach to this aspect of undue influence
83
 and it can be argued that this 
(quantitative) aspect of undue influence is used by the courts to covertly distinguish 
between conduct which they believe to be acceptable and conduct which they believe 
to be unacceptable.
84
  Such a conclusion is made more tempting given that this 
quantitative enquiry is a question of law,
85
 it is context-specific
86
 and it is said to be 
informed by ‗public policy‘.87  Support for such a view can be found in Bank of 
Scotland v Bennett:
88
  
                                                 
74
 (1787) 1 Cox CC 333, 29 ER 1191. 
75
 (1864) 4 De GJ & S 388; 46 ER 968. 
76
 (1888) 40 ChD 312. 
77
 [1978] 1 WLR 255n. 
78
 See, for example, National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] 1 AC 686 at 709F-H where Lord 
Scarman stated: ―I would wish to give a warning.  There is no precisely defined law setting the limits to 
the equitable jurisdiction of a court to relieve against undue influence.  This is the world of doctrine, 
not of neat and tidy rules…A court in the exercise of this jurisdiction is a court of conscience.  
Definition is a poor instrument when used to determine whether a transaction is or is not 
unconscionable:  this is a question of fact which depends on the facts of the case.‖  See also Dunbar 
Bank plc v Nadeem [1998] 3 All ER 876 and Lloyds Bank plc v Lucken [1998] 4 All ER 738. 
79
  See further Devenney & Chandler, supra n53 at pp562-567. 
80
 Birks & Chin, supra n73, p87. 
81
 Chen-Wishart, supra n69, p208. 
82
 See, for example, Tate v Williamson (1866) LR 2 Ch App 55. 
83
  In Bank of Scotland v Bennett [1997] 3 FCR 193 at 216C James Munby QC, sitting as a Deputy 
Judge of the High Court, stated : ―It is impossible to define, and difficult even to describe, at what point 
influence becomes, in the eye of the law, undue.‖ 
84
 Devenney & Chandler, supra n53, p562-564. 
85
 Re T (An Adult: Medical Treatment) [1992] 2 FCR 861, 883B per Staughton LJ. 
86
 Mrs U  v Centre for Reproductive Medicine [2002] EWCA Civ 565. 
87
 Mutual Finance Ltd v John Wetton & Sons Ltd [1937] 2 KB 389 at 394-395 per Porter J.  See also J 
Devenney & R Morgan, ‗Mrs U v Centre for Reproductive Medicine‘ (2003) 25 Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law 74. 
88
 [1997] 3 FCR 193.  
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At the end of the day the question of whether or not there has, in any particular case, been 
actual undue influence involves a value judgment.
89 
 
Given the controversy surrounding the jurisprudential basis of the doctrine of undue 
influence, in the remainder of this paper we will explore the nature, and extent, of the 
protection given to the elderly, in relation to financial transactions involving their 
home, by the unconscionable bargain doctrine.  In particular, we will consider the 
protection which this doctrine might provide in the context of elders entering into 
equity release schemes.   
 
(b) The Cartography of the Doctrine of the Unconscionable Bargain Doctrine 
 
The unconscionable bargain doctrine is of considerable antiquity
90
 and, in recent 
times, it has undergone a renaissance in Australia and New Zealand.
91
  By contrast, 
during the same period, the unconscionable bargain doctrine has operated more 
modestly in England and Wales,
92
 although, as we have seen, it is arguable that the 
doctrine of undue influence has been, to an extent, mimicking the unconscionable 
bargain doctrine.  Indeed one commentator has described the unconscionable bargain 
doctrine as a ―living fossil‖93 in England and Wales.  Moreover, the parameters of the 
                                                 
89
 Ibid at 220D (emphasis added). 
90
 See Chesterfield v Jansen (1750) 2 Ves. Sen. 125 at 130 and, generally, LA Sheridan, Fraud in 
Equity (Pitman, London, 1957).  See also Proof v Hines (1735) Cases Talbot 111 and D.E.C. Yale (ed.) 
Nottingham’s Chancery Cases 72 Seldon Society xcvi, n.3.  Many of the early cases involved 
‗expectant heirs‘: see, for example, Earl of Ardglasse v Muschamp (1684) 1 Vern. 273. It is clear that 
the doctrine in favour of ‗expectant heirs‘ and the general unconscionable bargain doctrine developed 
separately: see, for example, Webster v Cook (1866-7) L.R. 2 Ch. 542 and the Sale of Reversion Act 
1867 (now Law of Property Act 1925, s 174).  However, it is not clear whether or not these two 
doctrines had a common genesis: in O’Rourke v Bolingbroke (1877) App. Cas. 814 the Lord 
Chancellor was of the opinion that the general doctrine was borne of the rule in favour of ‗expectant 
heirs‘, but the converse is not unarguable - see Fletcher, ‗Unconscionable Transactions‘ [1974] QLJ 1. 
Today it seems that ‗expectant heirs‘ will not be treated as sui generis: see Re Brocklehurst (deceased) 
[1978] 1 A.C.  438.  cf.  Benyon v Cook (1875) L.R.10 Ch. App. 389. 
91
 See D Capper, ‗Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation‘ (1998) 114 L.Q.R. 479, I 
Hardingham, ‗The High Court of Australia and Unconscionable Dealing‘ (1984) 4 Ox.J.L.S. 275 and A 
Finlay, ‗Unconscionable Conduct and the Business Plaintiff: Has Australia Gone too Far?‘ [1999] 
Anglo-American Law Review 470. 
92
 See Devenney & Chandler, supra n53 and cf. Cresswell v Potter [1978] W.L.R. 258n, Portman 
Building Society v Dusangh [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 221 at 233, Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland 
NV v Burch [1997] 1 All E.R. 144, Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No.2) [2001] EWCA Civ 1466, 
Irvani v Irvani [2000] 1 Lloyd‘s Rep.412, Barclay’s Bank plc v Goff [2001] EWCA Civ 635, and Jones 
v Morgan [2002] EWCA Civ 565. 
93
 J Ross-Martyn, ‗Unconscionable Bargains‘ (1971) 121 N.L.J. 1159. 
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unconscionable bargain doctrine are faint,
94
 although in Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v 
Total Oil GB Ltd,
95
 Peter Millett Q.C., sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, 
was able to distil three elements from the case law: 
 
…if the cases are examined, it will be seen that three elements have almost invariably been 
present before the court has interfered.  First, one party has been at a serious disadvantage to 
the other…secondly, this weakness of the one party has been exploited by the other in some 
morally culpable manner...and thirdly, the resulting transaction has been, not merely hard or 
improvident, but overreaching and oppressive.  Where there has been a sale at an undervalue, 
the under-value has almost always been substantial, so that it calls for an explanation...In 
short, there must, in my judgment, be some impropriety, both in the conduct of the stronger 
party and in the terms of the transaction itself (though the former may often be inferred from 
the latter in the absence of an innocent explanation) — which in the traditional phrase ~ 
shocks the conscience of the court,‖ and makes it against equity and good conscience of the 
stronger party to retain the benefit of a transaction he has unfairly obtained.
96
 
 
However, as this passage suggests, these elements should not be viewed in an 
excessively technical manner; the courts adopt a holistic, qualitative approach to 
determining whether or not a transaction is unconscionable.
97
  Moreover, as we will 
argue below, the application of these elements is loaded with normative assumptions. 
 
(c) Vulnerability 
 
Central to the operation of the unconscionable bargain doctrine are conceptions of 
vulnerability,
98
 sometimes referred to in the relevant case law by the nomenclature of 
                                                 
94
  See J Devenney ‗A Pack of Unruly Dogs: Unconscionable Bargains, Lawful Act (Economic) Duress 
and Clogs on the Equity of Redemption‘ [2002] JBL 539. 
95
 [1983] 1 All E.R. 944. 
96
 Ibid at 961e-g. The Court of Appeal largely avoided discussion of the unconscionable bargain 
doctrine: see [1985] 1 All ER 585. 
97
 Capper, supra n110 at p496, approved in Portman Building Society v Dusangh [2000] 2 All E.R. 
(Comm) 221. 
98
 It is reasonably clear that inequality of exchange (‗substantive unconscionability‘) is insufficient, per 
se, to ground relief under the unconscionable bargain doctrine: see, for example, Maynard v Moseley 
(1676) 3 Swans. 651; Wood v Fenwick (1702) Pr. Ch. 206; Floyer v Sherard (1743) Amb. 18; Lukey v 
O’Donnel (1805) 2 Sch. & L. 395; Longmate v Ledger (1860) 2 Giff. 157; Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. v 
Governor of Bank of England (1981) 125 S.J. 528 (where Walton J. reinforced the primary principle of 
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‗special‘ or ‗serious‘ disadvantage.99  Thus relief may be granted under the 
unconscionable bargain doctrine where a person has entered into a contract as the 
result of drunkenness
100
 or mental deficiency.
101
  Yet, as we have already 
suggested,
102
 if relief hovers around questions of capacity, the protection provided by 
the unconscionable bargain doctrine to elders, in the context of financial transactions 
involving their home, is likely to be limited.  For example, in Investors Compensation 
Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society
103
 - a case with particular significance in 
the context of equity release schemes, as it involved ‗Home Income Plans‘ executed 
with elderly consumers - the Court stressed that: 
 
…although able to understand concepts such as the borrowing of money on security and the 
payment of interest, the claimants were not financially sophisticated people and not in a 
position, without the advice of persons more expert than themselves, properly to judge the 
risks involved in embarking on a Home Income Plan…104 
 
Moreover, as we have already noted,
105
 it is important to appreciate that the 
vulnerability which an elder might experience in this context may stem from a variety 
of social and economic factors.  It is equally important to recognise that the provision 
of information and advice – as envisaged under the statutory regulation of this area – 
is not a panacea for the range of social and economic vulnerabilities in this area.
106
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
pacta sunt servanda; Rowan v Dann (Unreported) 21 February 1991, Ch. D; Clarion Limited v 
National Provident Institution [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1888. cf. Keen v Stuckely (1721) Gil. 155 and Walter v 
Dalt (1676) 1 Ch. Ca. 276 where an alternative view is advanced.  See also LA Sheridan & G Keeton, 
Fraud and Unconscionable Bargains (Barry Rose, Chichester, 1985) pp.9-10; cf. C Barton, ‗The 
Enforcement of Hard Bargains‘, (1987) 103 M.L.R. 118.  Gross inequality of exchange may, however, 
give rise to a presumption of fraud: Rowan v Dann (Unreported) 21 February 1991, Ch. D. 
99
 See, for example, Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil [1983] 1 W.L.R. 87.  See also LA Sheridan, 
Fraud in Equity, (Pitman, London, 1957) pp73-86; cf. Boustany v Pigott (1993) 69 P. & C.R. 298 
where relief was granted without an explicit identification of a ‗special disadvantage‘. 
100
 See, for example, Dunnage v White (1818) 1 Swan. 137; Griffin v Devenille (1781) 3 P.Wms. 130. 
101
 See, for example, Price v Berrington (1851) 3 Mac. & G. 486 and York Glass Co Ltd v Jubb (1925) 
134 L.T. 36. 
102
  See above section 2. 
103
 [1999] Lloyd‘s Rep PN 496. 
104
 Ibid, at 513. 
105
 Above, section 2. 
106
  See section 3. 
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It is, however, clear that the unconscionable bargain doctrine is sensitive to socio-
economic factors.  Thus in Fry v Lane
107
 Kay J. felt able to extract the following 
principles from previous case-law: 
 
[W]here a purchase is made from a poor and ignorant man at a considerable undervalue, the 
vendor having no independent advice, a Court of Equity will set aside the transaction.  This 
will be done even in the case of property in possession and a fortiori if the interest is 
reversionary.
108
 
 
The relevance of socio-economic factors is also vividly demonstrated by Cresswell v 
Potter
109
 where Megarry J. sought to update the guidance laid out in Fry v Lane: ―the 
euphemisms of the 20
th
 century may require the word ‗poor‘ to be replaced by 
‗member of the lower income group‘ or the like, and the word ‗ignorant‘ by less 
highly educated.‖110  It is also clear that old age is a relevant, if perhaps 
unquantifiable, factor in the case law.
111
 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing it will be fascinating to observe how, if at all, some of 
the ideas discussed above - such as the idea that the homes of the elderly are 
repositories of capital to fund their expenses in old age – impact on the court‘s 
conceptions of vulnerability in this context.
112
  Certainly in the context of the 
analogous doctrine of undue influence, Burns has noted ostensible differences in the 
case law in respect of the court‘s approach to establishing a relationship of trust and 
confidence between an elder and their offspring.
113
  In particular, Burns notes that in 
some cases an elderly parent-child relationship was sufficient to establish a 
relationship of trust and confidence;
114
 whereas in other cases more was required.
115
 
  
                                                 
107
 (1888) 40 Ch. D. 312. 
108
 ibid . at 322. 
109
 See also Mountford v Callaghan (unreported, 29
th
 September 1999, Q.B.D.) and, in particular, 
Growden v Bean (unreported, 26 July 1982, Q.B.D.). 
110
 ibid . 
111
  See, for example, Clark v Malpas (1862) 4 De G.F. & J. 401, 45 ER 1238; Baker v Monk (1864) 4 
De G.J. & S. 388; 46 E.R. 968; and Portman Building Society v Dusangh [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 
221. 
112
 cf. Burns, supra n44, pp272-273. 
113
 Ibid. 
114
  See, for example, Love v Love (unreported, 11 March 1999, CA). 
115
  See, for example, Davies v Dobson (unreported, 7 July 2000, Ch. D). 
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(d) Transactional Outcomes 
 
The unconscionable bargain doctrine is also sensitive
116
 to the terms of the 
transaction.
117
 This may be particularly significant in the context of equity release 
schemes where the focus of statutory regulation is on the provision of information and 
advice, rather than transactional outcomes.  Moreover, the analogy with the former 
manifest disadvantage requirement in the context of undue influence suggests that the 
assessment of transactional outcomes will be influenced by normative assumptions.
118
  
If so, it will be intriguing to observe how some of the ideas discussed above - such as 
the idea that the homes of the elderly are repositories of capital to fund their expenses 
in old age – impact on the application of the unconscionable bargain doctrine in this 
context.
119
  Likewise, in situations where an elderly parent attempts to assist adult 
offspring onto the housing ladder, it will be intriguing to observe how ideas, such as 
the advancement of the interests of offspring, impact on the application of the 
unconscionable bargain doctrine in this context.  A glimpse of these socio-culturally 
charged issues can be seen in Portman Building Society v Dusangh.
120
  In that case an 
old, illiterate man mortgaged his home to support the business ventures of his son.  In 
refusing to utilise the unconscionable bargain doctrine the Court placed heavy 
reliance on its view that the transaction was not to the manifest disadvantage of the 
father.  Simon Brown LJ stated: 
 
                                                 
116
  In Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil GB Ltd [1983] 1 All E.R. 944 Peter Millett QC, sitting as a 
Deputy Judge of the High Court, felt that substantive unconscionability was a pre-requisite of relief 
under the unconscionable bargain doctrine.  However, it appears that this is not necessarily the case: 
see, for example, Cooke v Clayworth (1811) Ves. 12; 34 E.R. 222. 
117
  See J Devenney, An Analytical Deconstruction of the Unconscionable Bargain Doctrine in England 
and Wales (unpublished Ph D thesis, University of Wales, Cardiff, 2003) pp287-312.  There is some 
uncertainty as to whether or not the unconscionable bargain doctrine is relevant in the context of gifts.  
In Langton v Langton [1995] 2 FLR 890 – a case involving an elder -  AWH Charles, sitting as a 
Deputy Judge of the Chancery Division, held that the unconscionable bargain doctrine was not relevant 
in the context of gifts.  In so doing the learned judge appears to have been seduced by the shorthand 
title of the doctrine.  Indeed there is earlier authority, which was not considered by the learned judge, 
supporting both positions: see Henshall v Fereday (1873) 29 LT 46 and Mousley v Reid [1974] EG 17.  
It seems that the unconscionable bargain doctrine does apply to suretyship transactions: see Credit 
Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All E.R. 144.  In such transactions the surety may not 
get any benefit from the transaction and, therefore, such transactions might be regarded as analogous to 
gifts. 
118
 Devenney & Chandler, supra n53 at pp564-566. 
119
 See Burns, supra n64, pp272-273. 
120
 [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221. 
  
21 
―…it was not manifestly disadvantageous to this appellant that he should be able to raise 
money…so as to benefit his son…I would agree... But I simply cannot accept that building 
societies are required to police transactions of this nature to ensure that parents… are wise in 
seeking to assist their children…In short, the conscience of the court is not shocked.‖121 
 
This was echoed by Ward LJ, who added that: 
 
…it was a case of father coming to the assistance of the son.  True it is that it was a financially 
unwise venture…and the father‘s home was at risk.  But there was nothing…which comes 
close to morally reprehensible conduct or impropriety.  No unconscientious advantage has 
been taken of the father‘s…paternal generosity…The family wanted to raise money: the 
building society was prepared to lend it.  One shakes one‘s head, but with sadness…alas not 
with moral outrage.
 122
 
 
(e) Independent Advice 
 
Many of the leading cases on the unconscionable bargain doctrine make some 
reference to the relevance of independent advice, although there is very little 
discussion of the precise role of independent advice in this context.
123
  For present 
purposes, it will suffice to note that independent advice is not regarded as a panacea in 
this context.
124
 
 
(f) Theoretical Framework 
 
The precise nature, and extent, of the protection given by the unconscionable bargain 
doctrine to the elderly in relation to financial transactions involving their home is, of 
course, linked to the theoretical framework within which the foregoing elements 
operate.  In Hart v O’Connor125 the Privy Council located the unconscionable bargain 
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 Ibid, at 228-230. 
122
 Ibid, at 234.  
123
  See J Devenney, An Analytical Deconstruction of the Unconscionable Bargain Doctrine in England 
and Wales (unpublished Ph D thesis, University of Wales, Cardiff, 2003) pp271-283.   
124
  See, for example, Backhouse v Backhouse [1978] 1 All E.R. 1158 at 1166 per Balcombe J. 
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 [1985] 2 W.L.R. 944 at 958. 
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doctrine under the umbrella of the rather elusive notion of procedural 
unconscionability.
126
  Birks and Chin, as noted above, argued that unconscionability is 
defendant-sided relief and, in so doing, they linked the concept of unconscionability 
to a notion of ‗wicked exploitation‘.  Yet, as one of the current authors has argued 
elsewhere,
127
 many of the cases on the unconscionable bargain doctrine – particularly, 
although by no means exclusively,
128
 those from the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century
129
 - reveal a strong claimant-sided flavour.  Whilst we do not wish to rehearse 
those arguments here, the words of Turner LJ in Baker v Monk
130
 bear repetition 
given the valuable insight they offer into the operation of the unconscionable bargain 
doctrine: 
 
I say nothing about improper conduct on the part of the Appellant; I do not wish to enter into 
the question of conduct.  In cases of this description there is usually exaggeration on both 
sides, and I am content to believe that in this case there has been no actual moral fraud on the 
part of the Appellant in the transaction; but, for all that, in my judgment an improvident 
contract has been entered into.
131  
 
Such a view seems to find some resonance with the notion of ―passive acceptance‖ 
outlined by the Privy Council in Hart v O’Connor.132  In fact, if the cases which adopt 
a claimant-sided approach are further analysed, at least two different approaches are 
evident within them: the ‗causal-connection‘ approach and the ‗status‘ approach.133  
The essence of the causal-connection approach is that the resultant bargain is causally 
linked to the claimant‘s vulnerability.134  By contrast, the essence of the status 
approach is that a court has the power to relieve particular sections of society from 
                                                 
126
 Ibid., at 958.  See also R Clark, ‗The Unconscionability Doctrine Viewed from an Irish Perspective‘ 
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some forms of improvident bargain despite the fact that there is not necessarily a 
causal connection between the resultant bargain and the claimant‘s position.135  Such 
an approach is, perhaps, surprising although there are also hints of such an approach 
within the doctrine of undue influence in relation to relationships formerly described 
as 2A relationships.
136
  It remains to be seen, in the context of the unconscionable 
bargain doctrine, whether or not a ‗status approach‘ will be adopted in relation to 
elders and equity release schemes. 
 
(5) CONCLUSION 
 
There is a growing awareness of issues relating to the elderly, their homes and the 
transactions into which they enter.  In particular, there has been increased concern in 
relation to the use of equity release schemes.  Such schemes have dramatically 
increased in recent years and, given the social and economic factors at work here, an 
elder may be vulnerable in this context.  Although recent statutory regulation of this 
area is to be welcomed, it is important to appreciate the limitations of this regulation.  
In particular, the statutory regulation of this area is targeted at providing information 
and advice whereas it is crucial to recognise that the social and economic factors at 
work here, sometimes coupled with relational pressures, may still leave an informed 
elder in a vulnerable position.  As a result the equitable doctrine of undue influence 
may have an important role to play in providing a measure of legal protection for 
elderly homeowners who engage in these financial transactions.  However, the 
jurisprudential basis of the doctrine of undue influence is keenly disputed and if the 
views of Birks and Chin prevail the doctrine of undue influence will hover around 
questions of capacity. Moreover, if the doctrine of undue influence focuses solely on 
the capacity of the elderly person, the protection provided by the doctrine of undue 
influence in such situations is likely to be limited.  Accordingly, this paper has 
suggested that the unconscionable bargain doctrine - a doctrine which is particularly 
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sensitive to the terms of the transaction, the effectiveness of any independent advice, 
informational inequalities and the vulnerabilities of the parties – has an important role 
to play in this context.  However, the precise protection afforded by the 
unconscionable bargain doctrine in this context will, for example, depend on the 
application of the normative assumptions underpinning the assessment of 
transactional outcomes; and these may be informed by ideas such the contemporary 
political idea that the homes of the elderly are repositories of capital to fund their 
expenses in old age. 
 
